| 摘要: |
| 合理的医保合约以及对合约的有力执行会形成一种有效的激励和约束机制，通过这种机制可以影响医院的服务提供行为。本文探讨总额预付实施后在社保部门对医院进行监督奖惩和不进行监督奖惩两种情况下医院的策略选择，以及医保合约采取“结余留用、超支不补”和“结余奖励、超支分担”激励机制时医院的行为选择，试图回答在不同的预算约束下，医院对净收益的判断成为其决策和行为的出发点。 |
| 关键词: 总额预付 医院行为 博弈分析 |
| DOI： |
| 投稿时间：2018-03-17修订日期：2018-04-11 |
| 基金项目: |
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| Theoretical Analysis of Choice of Public Hospital Behavior under Global Budget |
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| Abstract: |
| Abstract Reasonable medical insurance contracts and the effective implementation of the contract will form an effective incentive and restraint mechanisms，Through this mechanism can affect the hospital's behavior.This article explores the strategy selection of the hospital after the implementation of the global budget in the two cases where the social medical insurance department supervises reward and punishment the hospital and the department does not supervise the hospital reward and punishment.and discusses the medical insurance contract adopts the incentive mechanism of “remaining balance，overruns don't supplement”and“balance rewards and overruns sharing”When the hospital's behavior choices.Trying to answer whether hospitals' judgments of net income are the starting point of their decisions and behaviors under different budget constraints. |
| Key words: global budget Hospital behavior Game analysis |